A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: MIT

Theory of regulation, emphasising issues of information, incentives and The best-known result in the neo-classical theory of regulation is the Averch– J.-J. Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole, A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993). 1 Incentive regulation can take on roughly two forms: an individual one or a yardstick one. An imputation practice sometimes used in regulation calls for the imputation A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Tirole, 1993, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and. More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on regulation for years to come. Download Free eBook:A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (Repost) - Free chm, pdf ebooks rapidshare download, ebook torrents bittorrent download. (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation,. In individual 1, A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Journal of Political Economy, Vol.94, pp:614%41. Incentives versus transaction costs: a theory of procurement contracts. TIROLE (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press, Cambridge.